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Comparison of STS and ArchiMate Risk and Security Overlay 
Abstract: 
Nowadays ArchiMate is widely used in enterprise architecture modelling of the various 
business domains and briefly could be described as something in between UML and BPMN 
with main focus in  architectural perspective. STS in its turn is focusing on socio-technical 
perspective and taking into consideration social interactions betwen actors. Current state of 
the art is talking about Secure Socio-Technical Systems and ArchiMate separately. This is 
perfectly fine because this two approaches are quite different. Still, they have a lot in 
common. Based on the state described above problem could be identified as an absence of 
tools or approaches which will combine these two approaches into a new one, which will 
take into consideration both architectural and socio-technical perspectives of modelling. 
This combination could be beneficial because ArchiMate risk and security overlay models 
risk management and STS models how actors involved in this system interact with each 
other from social point of view and highlights “human factor” in security. Thus, combination 
of them could potentially result in security modelling approach which will cover both 
architecture and social points of view. Ideally, this approach will create some workarounds 
over weak places in both initial approaches and heavily use their best parts. We will also 
validate this approach in terms of completeness with respect to ISSRM. In this paper we 
will describe this combined approach. 
Keywords: STS, ArchiMate, ISSRM, Security requirements engineering, Security risk 
management, ArchiMate Risk and Security Overlay 
CERCS: P170  Computer science, numerical analysis, systems, control 
STSi ja ArchiMate'i võrdlus turvalisuse modelleerimisel 
Lühikokkuvõte: 
ArchiMate'i kasutatakse tänapäeval laialdaselt erinevates ärivaldkondades 
ettevõttesüsteemide arhitektuuri modelleerimiseks ning seda võib iseloomustada 
modelleerimise tööriistana, mis ühendab endas UML'i ja BPMN'i. STS keskendub aga 
sotsiotehnilisele perspektiivile ja tegijatevahelistele sotsiaalsetele vastastikmõjudele. Kuigi 
neil on palju ühist, on tegemist siiski erinevate lähenemistega, mistõttu räägitakse 
tänapäeval ArchiMate'st ja Secure Socio-Technical Systems'ist valdavalt kui 
eraldiseisvatest süsteemidest. Sellise olukorra tõttu on tekkinud puudujääk tööriistadest ja 
lähenemistest, mis ühendaks kaks süsteemi üheks uueks, mis võtaks arvesse nii 
modelleerimise arhitektuurseid kui ka sotsiotehnilisi aspekte. Selline kombinatsioon võib 
osutuda kasulikuks, kuna ArchiMate'ga saab modelleerida riskijuhtimist ja STS abil saab 
modelleerida erinevate süsteemi kaasatud tegijate omavahelist suhtlemist sotsiaalsest 
vaatevinklist ja turvalisuse inimfaktorit. Seega nende kahe süsteemi ühendamise teel võib 
luua turvalisuse modelleerimise lähenemise, mis katab nii arhitektuurilised kui sotsiaalsed 
vaatevinklid. Ideaalselt kasutaks selline lähenemine mõlema süsteemi tugevamaid külgi ja 
lahendaks mõned kitsaskohad. Lähenemise terviklikust hinnatakse ISSRM'i suhtes. Selles 
lõputöös kirjeldatakse ülalmainitud kombineeritud lähenemist turvalisuse 
modelleerimisele.  
Võtmesõnad: STS, ArchiMate, ISSRM, Turvanõuete insener, Turvariski juhtimine, 
ArchiMate risk and Security Overlay 
CERCS: P170 Arvutiteadus, arvanalüüs, süsteemid, kontroll 
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1 Introduction 
Nowadays software has a huge influence on all aspects of our life. From internet surfing and 
talking with someone online to bank transactions and social networks. Huge amount of peo-
ple's personal data goes through software systems and no one wants it to be stolen. Moreo-
ver, people willing to use all this system without any errors. Therefore, from day to day 
software security becomes more and more important in real life. Swift growth of distributed 
systems forced developers, designers, managers and all other people related to developing 
software to consider software security as one of the most important activities in developing 
cycle.  
Software security does not depend only on outer reasons such as firewalls, but also on inner 
software application security. Inner security is a main anxiety for modern software systems 
and it could be achieved by system modelling in context of threats and security. 
Huge variety of different modelling approaches has been developed to solve the software 
security issues. In this paper I will take a closer look on STS method of designing secure 
software systems and ArchiMate - modelling language for enterprise architecture. After de-
scribing in details what are the main things in this approaches we will compare and integrate 
them. Integration will be validated either by the proof of concept (prototype) or by illustrat-
ing the usage on extensive example. 
Scope of this work will mainly be in security risk managementfield. In this field STS and 
ArchiMate risk and security overlay were chosen to work with. Note, that we are taking into 
consideration only risk and security overlay, not the whole core ArchiMate. 
Regarding motivation: Combining ArchiMate and STS could be a good idea because they 
both are visual notations for modelling security risks and their main focus are slightly dif-
ferent. Main idea of STS is that designing secure software systems should take into consid-
eration socio-technical perspective of the system along with technical side instead of mod-
elling only technical side. ArchiMate, in its turn, is all about architectural modelling (in-
cludes business, technical and infrastructural architectures). Thus, combination of them 
could easily benefit from ArchiMate in architectural perspective and from STS in socio-
technical perspective, leading into potentially good way to model security risks. 
Research problem is mainly about integrating ArchiMate and STS. State of the art shows 
that there are no integrations of this two approaches, therefore we need to find out how to 
integrate ArchiMate and STS into one approach and how to evaluate integrated approach.  
1.1 Research Question 
Ergo, main research question of this paper could be formulated as following: 
How could ArchiMate and STS be integrated into one security risk modelling approach, 
which will combine advantages from each of them? 
Defined sub-questions are following: 
What is ArchiMate risk and security overlay and how it maps into ISSRM? 
What is STS and how it maps into ISSRM? 
What is comparison criteria for ArchiMate RSO and STS? 
What is the optimal way to integrate ArchiMate RSO and STS? 
How can integrated approach benefit from ArchiMate RSO and STS? 
How can integrated approach be evaluated? 
9 
 
What is completeness of integrated approach regarding ISSRM? 
What are the directions of future work to improve integrated approach? 
1.2 Summary of the contribution 
Main contribution consists from presenting new risk and security management modelling 
approach which was created from integration of STS and ArchiMate RSO. To achieve inte-
gration of STS and ArchiMate RSO we first compared them under ISSRM terms. To be able 
to compare STS and RSO under ISSRM concepts we initially mapped RSO and STS con-
cepts to ISSRM concepts. Integrated approach is built in the following way: we took STS 
as “skeleton” for new approach and noticed that STS lacks a lot of concepts in risk and 
security field. STS has only “threat event” and relationship “threatens” to model threats and 
risks. That’s why we introduced whole new view and called it “risk and security view”. We 
populated this view with RSO models which are connected to threat events on social and 
information views (we allowed to use threat events on information views to better model 
threat which are not social based). New integrated approach is presented with expanded 
explanation which consists from semantics, concrete syntax and application guidelines for 
it. We decided to evaluate integrated approach in terms of completeness for ISSRM con-
cepts. We calculated completeness by calculation how much of ISSRM concepts (elements 
and relationships) are presented in approach. To be able to compare results for integrated 
approach with other approaches we selected two additional approaches (besides STS, RSO 
and integrated): Secure Tropos, because it correlates with STS and DEMO, because it cor-
relates with ArchiMate. Results showed that integrated approach is the only one among 
compared approaches that fully covers ISSRM concepts, thus making it 100% complete in 
ISSRM terms. In addition, we modelled same case through five different approaches and 
compared outcome models. This comparison highlighted good sides of integrated approach 
(pointed out on various places where considered attack is possible, heavy loaded with infor-
mation risk and security view) and downsides too (the most complex and most time-con-
suming model building among all compared approaches). 
1.3 Case for application guidelines 
As for example of usage I will use healthcare scenario derived from Hong Kong Red 
Cross Blood Transfusion Centre (Red Cross BTC). Detailed description of case is availa-
ble at Hong Kong Red Cross BTC website1. I was influenced by STS book [1], as it is 
used there. 
In this example organisations (hospitals, labs) interact with each other and with humans 
(patients, doctors, nurses) to provide healthcare services. Doctors use medical equipment 
to care about patients, patients provide their personal data in order to receive healthcare, 
hospital personnel enter patient personal data into information system and so on. 
Alice is one of the donors who periodically donates blood. Centre takes responsibility of 
collecting and testing blood. It is also responsible for transferring applicable blood to dif-
ferent hospitals. Red Cross BTC also should check eligibility of donors, but the actual 
blood tests are done in special laboratories.  
Hospitals hold all info about their patients along with info about transfusions. Information 
about transfusion, reason for it, type of operation, medical personnel etc. are stored in hos-
pital database. Actual healthcare services are provided to patients by physicians, who got 
access to patient personal information.  
                                                 
1 https://www5.ha.org.hk/rcbts/enindex.asp  
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Patients personal info and blood consumption rates can be accessed by Red Cross BTC to 
perform statistical and analysis estimate blood consumption rates in future and to make 
recommendations on blood usage. 
Hospital authority setups privacy regulations concerning patient’s personal data. Red 
Cross BTC reports to hospital authority, which keeps patient’s information private accord-
ing to regulations. 
Overall success of this system heavily depends on efficient interaction between physi-
cians, labs, patients, hospitals, hospital authority, donors and Red Cross BTC. Each actor 
has its own security expectations, what limits the way how other actors can interact with 
assets that they want to protect. For example, donors allow Red Cross BTC to collect their 
personal data and use it for statistical analysis but they don't want to expose this infor-
mation to third parties. In case if a famous people hospitalised they prefer all information 
related to their conditions to be confidential. 
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2 Security risk management 
This chapter covers security risk management frameworks, such as ISSRM, Cybersecurity 
framework and Practical information risk management process framework. Summary pro-
vides argumentation why ISSRM was chosen among other options. 
2.1 What is information system security risk management (ISSRM)? 
ISSRM stands for information systems security risk management, and described in [9]. 
ISSRM was developed by a survey of security risk management methods and security risk 
management standards and summarises in ISSRM domain model represented below. In a 
few words - ISSRM is a framework to compare and standardise other security risk manage-
ment approaches.  
ISSRM domain model consist from three main aspects: risk treatment-related concepts, risk-
related concepts and asset-related concepts. In general domain model represented as UML 
diagram below. This figure is taken from [9]. 
Asset-related concepts show which of organization's assets are important and requires pro-
tection. Asset - anything what is valuable for organisation and what is needed to reach or-
ganization's goals. Assets divides into business and IS assets. Business assets represents 
skills, processes, capabilities and information important for business core functionality. IS 
assets represents parts/components of information system which are important for organi-
sation since they support business assets. IS assets are usually part of information system 
(hardware, software) or person/facility who plays role in a system. Security constraints rep-
resents security need and usually are properties of business assets [9]. 
Risk-related concepts represent risk itself and its components. Risk is a combination of 
threat and vulnerability which leads to damage for two or more assets, what is called impact. 
Impact is a potential negative effects on business assets. Impact could be defined at IS asset 
level (broken component), or at business asset level where it brakes security criteria (loss of 
availability, loss of confidentiality).  
Risk event - combination of threat and several vulnerabilities. Vulnerability - property of IS 
asset that represents weakness in security. Threat - incident done by threat agent that exploits 
vulnerabilities and causes damage to assets. Threat agent - agent who intentionally want to 
harm assets [9]. 
Risk-treatment related concepts represent concepts to treat risk. Risk treatment decision - 
decision on how to treat identified risk, which satisfies security need. There are four types 
of decisions: 
 Risk avoidance: decision to avoid risk, performed by withdrawing or modifying part 
of functionality.  
 Risk reduction: actions to make risk less likely to happen, reduce risk impact. 
 Risk transfer: decisions related to how parties share damage from risk. 
 Risk retention: compose acceptance of damage from the risk.  
Security requirement - environment condition that we bring to life by using information 
system in order to soften risks. Control (countermeasure, safeguard) is created to implement 
security requirements. Security controls can be represented by devices, policies, processes, 
or other components of IS asset that act to reduce risk [9]. 
 
12 
 
 
Figure 1. ISSRM domain model [9] 2 
                                                 
2 This and following models with same style are built in online tool available at: https://www.draw.io/  
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Regarding relationships in ISSRM. IS asset can support business asset in any form, but 
business asset can be standalone, without any support from IS assets (employee skills). Se-
curity criterion can constraint some or none business assets, but business assets not neces-
sarily need to be constrained by security criteria. Event should always lead to impact, if 
there is no impact – event doesn’t make any risk. Impact could provoke other unpredicted 
impacts. Impact always harms assets; however, asset could remain unharmed. Also, impact 
always negates at least one security criterion, but security criterion could not be negated by 
impacts. Threat could exploit some vulnerabilities or none of them. Vulnerability can be 
exploited by none or several threats. Vulnerability is always a characteristic of asset, but 
asset could not have any vulnerabilities. Threat always targets one or more assets and asset 
can be not targeted. Threat agent could use attack method, and one attack method could be 
used by several threat agents. Risk treatment always points to decision to treat at least one 
risk. Risk treatment could be refined to zero or more security requirements, but security 
requirements always refines one or more risk treatments. Security requirement always mit-
igates at least one risk, but risk could not have related security requirements. Control always 
implements one or more security requirements, and security requirements is always imple-
mented by at least one control. 
2.2 Cybersecurity framework 
Cybersecurity framework is a risk-based approach to manage cybersecurity risks in infor-
mation systems and is developed in National Institute of Standards and Technology, United 
States Department of Commerce. Latest framework version is described in [18], following 
framework description is based on this whitepaper. Framework consist from three parts: 
Core, Implementation Tiers, Profiles.  Each framework part consolidates relations between 
business drivers and cybersecurity activities. Core framework includes cybersecurity activ-
ities, outcomes and references, which are widely used in sector. It presents common guide-
lines, best practices and industry standards. Core part consist from five functions - Identify, 
Protect, Detect, Respond, Recover – which together provide strategic high-level view on 
organizations security risk management. After functions give their outcomes, framework 
maps this results to existing standarts, guidelines or practices for each category. 
Implementation tiers gives context about organization’s views on risks and processes to 
manage them. They also state how well organization risk management are compared to the 
ones described in framework. Tiers characterize organization’s processes from partial (tier 
1) to adaptive (tier 4). These tiers show company’s progress towards agile and risk-informed 
processes. Framework profile shows outcomes from business needs, which are selected 
from framework categories. Overall, profile is a combination of practices, standards and 
guidelines. They are used to compare “as is” profile with “to be” profile. To create a profile, 
organization review all their processes along with categories and subcategories from the 
point of view of business drivers and risk assessment. Current organization profile used for 
prioritization and following progress to “to be” profile. 
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Figure 2. Cybersecurity framework core structure [18] 
2.3 Practical Information Risk Management Process Framework 
This framework is described in [19]. Following description is based on this paper. It is fo-
cusing on managing information area of risks. Framework consist from following steps: 
Identify (identify event which can cause risk), Analyze (measurements and prioritization of 
threats to select information security controls), Control (anything that mitigates threats and 
vulnerabilities), Monitor (process of systematical observing information controls perfor-
mance), Report (systematic reporting to decision makers). These steps applied for the fol-
lowing domains: Strategic (executive level, high-level objectives, policies and plans), Tac-
tical (management activities at program level, application of best-practices that meets long-
term and short-term objectives), Operational (low-level processes which instantly affects 
everyday operations). Application of steps on domains from the strategic tactical or opera-
tional point of view is all what this framework is about. 
 
Figure 3. Information Risk Management Process Framework [19] 
2.4 Summary 
This chapter briefly describes three frameworks for security risk management. Practical in-
formation risk management process framework and Cybersecurity frameworks provide best 
15 
 
practices and tools to analyse risks with aim to come up with risk controls, but both of them 
lack a structured and described domain model. We need domain model to have a tool for 
mapping modelling languages and their comparison in order to be able to integrate them. 
Therefore, we choose ISSRM as our security risk management tool for this paper. Based on 
ISSRM and its domain model we will make comparison between STS and ArchiMate RSO 
and integrate them.  
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3 Modelling languages 
3.1 Security and security risk management modelling languages 
This section will provide brief overview of security and risk management modelling lan-
guages. We will not pay much attention to this languages, as our main focus remains on STS 
and ArchiMate RSO. 
First modelling language that we will talk about is security risk-aware Secure Tropos. We 
decided to talk about it as it relates to STS. They both pay attention to social perspective of 
the system. This approach is introduced by Mouratidis in [13, 14, 15]. This approach is 
based on Tropos methodology [16]. Secure Tropos define system development through fol-
lowing phases: Early requirements (helps to define problem), Late requirements (defines 
desired state of system), Architectural design (deals with system architecture), Detailed de-
sign (defines each component by input, output, controls). Secure Tropos is separated by 
perspective of several models. 
Actor model defines actors and their dependency relationships. To enforce security limita-
tions, language introduce security limitations. They settle up security restrictions that actors 
must respect and system must follow. Dependency shows that one actor depends on another 
for any reason. Same goes for security dependencies, but they show that actors depend on 
each other to meet security limitations. 
Goal model represents actor’s reasons for fulfilling goals, plans and resources. Hardgoals 
represent main interests. Softgoals, in its turn, doesn’t have clear satisfaction criteria and 
depends on interpretation. Plan is a plan of how to do stuff. Resources represents valuable 
entity. Also, Means-Ends, Contribution and decomposition relationships are used on this 
model. Secure goals are same as regular goals, but they focus on security. Achievement of 
secure goal is described in secure task. There are also security reference diagrams, they 
represent conditions that can endanger system’s security features. Actual attack is defined 
by security attack scenario. Modelers can specify attacker’s role and his goals, and try to 
guess possible attacks on the system. 
Secure Tropos constructs are shown on the figure below, which is adapted from [9]. 
 
Figure 4. Secure Tropos language constructs [9] 
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Second chosen modelling language is Design and Engineering Methodology for Organiza-
tions (DEMO). We choose it as a counterpart for ArchiMate RSO, as they both are de-
signed for enterprise modelling. First of all, DEMO is an enterprise modeling methodol-
ogy, with a main idea of “communicative action”. It considers communication as essential 
part of functioning organization [20]. DEMO relies on DEMO specification language 
(DEMOSL) to graphically represent DEMO models. DEMOSL is described mainly in 
[21]. Following description is based on [21]. To model organization, DEMO build four 
models, which models different view on organization. Construction model gives view on 
organizations construction: composition (actors inside organization), environment (actors 
outside from organization), interaction structure (interactions between composition and 
environment), interstriction structure (information links between composition and environ-
ment). Action model gives view on organizations operations. This one consist from sets of 
action rules and work instructions. Action rule describes what should be done. Work in-
struction is not necessary; they mainly guide on how to perform action rule. Process model 
gives view on organization’s state space and transition space from perspective of coordi-
nation. It also contains entire process steps and transaction pattern, along with occurrence 
laws between transactions, which are visualized in links between process steps. Fact 
model gives view on organization’s state space and transition space from perspective of 
production. It contains identified facts and existence laws (reference, unicity and depend-
ency are visualized). This model also contains production event and occurrence laws for 
them. As scope of this work is in security and risk management, we will pay attention only 
to construction model, because only it is relevant for current scope, and it only makes 
sense to model violator on it (because it is the only place where we can model actors out-
side of organization). 
 
Figure 5. DEMO construction model elements 
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3.2 What is Secure Socio-Technical Systems (STS) 
STS is a method for designing secure software systems [1]. This method heavily focuses on 
the first stages of designing the system - requirements engineering. Main idea behind STS 
is that design of the secure software system should take into consideration socio-technical 
perspective of the system along with technical aspects of the system. STS is model-driven 
which means that main activity in it is constructing a model.  Constructed model represents 
security requirements of the system. This model is build using STS modelling language 
(STS-ml). This modelling language is the most important part of the model-driven way in 
SRE proposed by STS. STS-ml follows ten principles to ensure that if follows requirements 
for modelling languages and that it fits into socio-technical security requirements domain 
[1]. These principles are described below. 
Principle 1: Socio-Technical perspective. Modelling primitives must be enough to create 
security requirements models for socio-technical systems which involves humans, organi-
zations and software systems. These actors should interact with each other to reach their 
strategic objectives and fulfil requirements. 
Principle 2: Security about interactions. All participants in socio-technical systems are 
fully autonomous, therefore they are not controllable. Still, while interacting with other ac-
tors (to reach goals or transfer information), one actor usually imposes security requirements 
on another one. 
Principle 3: High-level assets. Modelling language should give opportunity to model high-
level assets of actors (objectives or information). 
Principle 4: Threats. Modelling language should provide functionality to describe and 
identify social and organizational threats, which are not related to technical vulnerabilities. 
Principle 5: Multiple Stakeholders. Each stakeholder has his own security requirements 
and sometimes they could conflict with another stakeholder security requirement. Therefore, 
language should capture stakeholder’s viewpoints and help with identification of conflicts. 
Principle 6: Diagrammatic and formal language. Formal semantics through primitives 
should be provided and language must support modelling through diagrams. 
Principle 7: Compliance with standards. When it is possible primitives should refer to the 
same standardised terminology. 
Principle 8: Minimality of concepts. Language should contain minimum set of primitives 
that are needed to capture security requirements. 
Principle 9: Traceability. Security requirements should be traceable to requester and his 
goals which caused this requirement to appear. 
Principle 10: Capturing security needs. Language should focus on needs of stakeholders 
and not on solutions to provide that needs. 
Main goal of STS-ml is to represent and visualise security requirements of system. Follow-
ing principle 7, stated at the beginning of this chapter, STS-ml should follow well know 
terminology. Unfortunately, there is no consensus on what basic terminology for SRE 
should be. Therefore, STS-ml proposes classification which consist of the following aspects: 
confidentiality, integrity, availability, authenticity, reliability and accountability. In the fol-
lowing text will be explained how STS-ml fulfils each of this aspects. 
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Confidentiality. This aspect represents the idea that confidential information should not be 
available for unauthorised users. In STS-ml confidentiality requirements represented by dif-
ferent types of authorisations. 
Integrity. This requirement ensures that information is not modified or deleted in unauthor-
ised way. In STS-ml integrity requirements for modification represented by authorisation 
type with specified Modify rules. Unfortunately, it is very challenging to capture deletion 
of information, because information could be tangible by various documents and their cop-
ies, thus STS-ml does not focus on it. 
Availability. This requirement means that system uptime is relatively high and system did 
not deny authorised users, and provides access to requested information in relatively good 
time. STS-ml differentiate between document availability and Goal availability. Document 
availability means that actor who provides document provide it with certain level of availa-
bility for actor who requests this document. It is usually visualized over document transmis-
sion with a sticky note with required percentage of availability. Goal availability means 
exactly the same as Document availability but in context of goals. 
Authenticity. This security aspect catches the ability to be authenticated verified and trusted. 
It is checked through authentication process which goal is to verify that users are who they 
say they are. STS-ml express authenticity over interactions between actors (goal delegations 
and document transmissions). Moreover, STS-ml defines authenticity in two variants: au-
thentication of delegator/sender and authentication of delegatee/receiver. 
Reliability. These security aspects represent threat from accidental errors. Usually under it 
security engineers mean that attackers trying to misuse system. In STS-ml reliability is rep-
resented through trustworthiness and redundancy. Trustworthiness requires delegatee to be 
trustworthy (provide certificate for example) and it is expressed over goal delegations by 
delegator. Redundancy is expressed over goal delegation and means that delegator wants 
delegatee to adopt redundant strategies for delegated goal by using alternative strategies 
(single actor) or by relying on other actors (multi-actor). 
Accountability. These aspects refer to the requirements for actions of an entity to be traced 
uniquely to that entity [2]. STS-ml supports this aspect in the following ways: non-redupli-
cation, non-redelegation, separation of duties, combination of duties. Non-reduplication 
means that sender or receiver should not be able to deny a transmitted message. Non-redel-
egation means that delegator request delegatee to take full responsibility for achieving del-
egated goal on himself, without any other actors. Separation of duties means separation of 
duties among different people when they are dealing with critical tasks (for example - open-
ing bank deposit box requires effort and information from different people). Combination 
of duties (sometimes in SRE literature called retain familiar [3]) means that same entities 
will be assigned to the same actor.  
 All security requirements described above are modelled through rectangle notation 
with first few letters of the aspect putted over the related entity in the model. If modelling 
requires additional information - it is usually visualised as sticky note near the rectangle 
notation. 
3.2.1 Semantics and Concrete syntax 
Following table presents semantics and concrete syntax for STS. It makes perfect sense to 
combine semantics and concrete syntax in one table because we show how element looks 
like and explains meaning behind it in one place, which makes semantics and concrete syn-
tax easier to remember and understand.  
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Table 1. STS-ml semantics and concrete syntax [8] 
Concept Graphical Notation Explanation 
Role/Agent 
 
Role is an abstraction of the 
actor (student). Agent repre-
sents concrete actor (John). 
Role/Agent 
Scope 
Possess 
Want 
 
Role/Agent scope represents 
which goals this role/agent 
want to achieve and which 
documents does this 
role/agent possess. 
Play 
 
Concrete agent plays role 
(John plays role Student) 
Goal 
Document 
Information 
 
 
Goal represents desired state 
of affairs (car is bought). 
Document represents ex-
changeable thing (paper doc-
ument) which usually con-
tains information (salary). 
Own 
 
Role/Agent is a full owner of 
some information and can de-
cide to transfer rights about it 
to other agents/roles 
Transmit 
 
Role/Agent transmits docu-
ment in his possession to an-
other role/agent. 
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Integrity of 
transmission 
 
Role/agent requires integrity 
of transmission form 
role/agent who provides doc-
ument 
Availability 
 
Requester demands minimum 
level of availability for docu-
ment provided. 
Confidentiality 
of transmission 
 
Provider demands confident 
transmission of document to 
receiver 
Authentication 
 
Sender/receiver requires au-
thentication on sending/re-
ceiving 
Tangible by 
 
Information is made tangible 
by representing it in a docu-
ment 
Part of 
 
One information is part of an-
other information. Same with 
documents. (“Name” is part 
of “Personal Information”). 
22 
 
AND-decompo-
sition 
 
And-decomposition means 
that through achieving goals 
2 and 3, Goal 1 will be also 
achieved. (sending letter -> 
letter written, letter sent). 
OR-decomposi-
tion 
 
Or-decomposition means that 
achieving either of the goals 2 
or 3 yields achieving goal 1. 
(letter written -> new letter 
written, letter copied). 
Read 
 
Document should be read to 
achieve goal. 
Produce 
 
Document is produced while 
achieving goal. 
Modify 
 
Document is modified while 
achieving a goal. 
Goal delegation 
No-redelegation 
Non-repudiation 
Redundancy 
Trustworthiness 
Availability 
Authentication 
 
Delegation: It means that 
role/agent delegates his goal 
to another role/agent. 
No-redelegation: Delegatee 
cannot delegate goal to third 
roles/agents. 
Non-repudiation: Delegatee 
cannot deny that goal was 
delegated 
Redundancy: Delegatee must 
take steps to ensure redundant 
goal fulfilment 
Trustworthiness: Delegatee 
must provide a proof of his 
trustworthiness 
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Availability: Delegatee must 
provide required level of 
availability for delegated goal 
Authentication: Delega-
tor/Delegatee shall authenti-
cate before delegating/receiv-
ing goal. 
 
Events 
 
Event can threaten goals, goal 
delegations, documents and 
actors. 
 
Authorization 
 
 
Role/Agent authorises an-
other role/agent to perform 
some operations on stated in-
formation in scope of the de-
scribed goal. Operations: 
Read, Modify, Produce, 
Transmit. Scope could be one 
or more goals 
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3.2.2 Abstract syntax 
Here we propose two new abstract concepts. First one - Actor includes Agent and Role 
elements. Actor has its name and can play Role. Second introduced abstract concept is Actor 
elements which are possessed by Actor. Actor elements include goal, document and infor-
mation elements. Information and documents could be split into sub-info and subdocuments 
with part of relations. Information could be represented in documents which is visualised 
by tangible relation. Goal can perform actions over document to achieve current goal. More-
over, goal can be decomposed into sub-goals with and/or relations. There is also Event ele-
ment which can threaten goal and document elements.   
 
Figure 6. STS abstract syntax, main elements 
Next diagram visualizes in details advanced Actor related elements in STS modelling lan-
guage. These relations are document transmit, goal delegation and authorisation. Transmit 
relation is represented by transmit rules and relation to document element. Goal delegation 
element is represented by various delegation type rules and relation to goal element. Au-
thorisation element is represented by authorization rules enumeration and set scope rela-
tion with goal along with on relations with document and information. 
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Figure 7. STS abstract syntax, advanced elements 
3.2.3 Application guidelines 
This chapter will contain example of modelled healthcare scenario which is described 
above, along detailed guides on how to use STS to model particular examples from 
healthcare scenario. In the end of the chapter there will be diagrams for complete scenario. 
Let's start from information view and in detail discuss case about Alice as a donor. In scope 
of information view, we have following information about Alice. She owns her personal 
information and health status which we will visualise with own relationship between Alice 
and this information. Both this pieces of information forms Alice's medical history, there-
fore we will create part of relations between new information entity medical history info 
and her personal information with health status. In STS terms if we want to use information 
somehow it must be represented in documents. From scenario scope we can say that Alice's 
health status and personal info are represented in her test results (we use tangible by relation 
to model this).  Moreover, Alice's personal info must be represented in her donor certificate 
and in hospitals health record. We also know that test result belongs to Laboratory which 
makes tests, and health record with donor certificate belongs to blood transfusion centre. 
Diagram for this case is presented below.  
26 
 
 
Figure 8. STS information view Alice example3 
For authorization view let’s take Alice's example too. Alice's owning of her personal info 
and health status along with representing it in medical history info remain the same as in 
information view. It is relevant to show which Role does Alice play in this view, so we show 
that she plays Donor role with play relationship. We know from previous example that La-
boratory uses Alice's health status and personal info to create document test results. This 
means that Alice must authorise Laboratory to have access to information that she owns. 
ModernLabs need to read and produce this info, and we model it with green checkmarks on 
related authorization panel. Also, it is necessary to sat that Alice allows ModernLabs to read 
and produce her info only for providing test results, that's why we set scope for goal results 
provided in this authorization. We also know that blood transfusion centre requires Alice's 
health status to approve hear as a donor, and Alice allows BTC to read but prohibits to 
modify her health status. This information is modelled in authorization element between 
Alice and Red Cross BTC. Also, Alice must authorize role physician to read and produce 
her health status. Diagram for this case presented below. 
                                                 
3This and following STS models build in STS tool available at: http://www.sts-tool.eu/downloads/ 
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Figure 9. STS Authorization view Alice example 
For social view example we will also take Alice example. Alice has one goal in scope of 
this scenario. She wants to donate blood. In order to achieve this goal Alice need to take 
tests and receive positive results. This means that we will decompose Alice’s goal blood 
donated into goals test taken and positive results achieved using AND-decomposition. Also, 
to reach goal positive results received we need to read document test results. This is mod-
elled by Read relation between corresponding goal and document. In scope of social view, 
it is also necessary to model that Alice plays role Donor. In order to take blood test Alice 
delegates her goal test taken to ModernLabs. This is modelled by goal delegation with no-
repudiation, no-redelegation, redundancy and authorization rules to model Alice's security 
needs. ModernLabs in its turn transmits document test results back to Alice with confiden-
tiality and integrity requirements to model security concerns on this document. After receiv-
ing test results Alice can transmit this document further to Red Cross BTC to donate blood. 
She does it with integrity, confidentiality and availability requirements. Model for this case 
presented below. 
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Figure 10. STS Social View Alice example1 
3.2.4 Mapping to ISSRM 
This chapter will clarify mapping between STS and ArchiMate based on definitions and 
meaning between concepts from both of them. Asset defined in ISSRM as anything that is 
valuable and plays role in accomplishing organizations objectives [9]. IS asset and Business 
assets are different types of assets, and main difference between them is that Business assets 
are immaterial and IS assets are material (including software). These concepts are presented 
in STS by Goal, Document and Information, since actors in STS see these concepts as val-
uable and since they are playing important role in achieving actor’s goals. Security criterion 
in ISSRM characterizes a security need [9]. From STS side we set up security criterion over 
document transmit and goal delegation, therefore all types of this relationships will fall 
down to this bucket (except confidentiality, integrity and availability). Security objectives 
created using security criteria on business assets and typically describe security objective to 
be achieved [9]. Also, they are defined in terms of confidentiality, integrity and availability. 
From this points we can conclude that document transmit and goal delegation relationships 
which describe confidentiality, integrity and availability maps into this concept. Security 
requirement is defined as a condition on the phenomena of the environment that we wish to 
make true [9]. In STS we define this conditions through authorization element, which grants 
access to asset with several security constraints.  Risk treatment decision, as defined in [9] 
– decision to treat identified risk. We don’t have these concepts in STS. Control – design 
means to improve the security by implementing security requirements [9]. We don’t have 
concepts for this in STS. 
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Table 2. STS mapping to ISSRM 
ISSRM concepts STS concepts 
Asset-related 
concepts 
Asset Goal, Document, Information 
Business asset Information, Goal 
IS asset Document 
Security criterion 
Document transmit related relationships 
(Authentication) 
Goal delegation related relationships (Avail-
ability) 
Security objective 
Document Transmit related relationships 
(Integrity of transmission, Availability, Con-
fidentiality of transmission) 
Goal delegation related relationships (Avail-
ability) 
Risk-related 
concepts  
Risk - 
Impact - 
Event Event 
Threat Threaten relationship 
Vulnerability - 
Threat agent - 
Attack method - 
Risk-treatment 
related concepts 
Risk treatment - 
Security requirements Authorization 
Control - 
As for risk-related concepts, we can easily map ISSRM event from STS to event concept in 
STS, since they share the same name. To prove this point, we will check event definition 
from ISSRM – risk event is an aggregation of threat and one of the vulnerabilities [9], which 
is in other words stands for some harming event that threatens assets, and this is exactly 
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what STS event is. Same mapping could be done for ISSRM threat concept. Threat concept 
defined as an incident initiated by threat agent using an attack method to target one or more 
IS assets by exploiting their vulnerabilities [9]. This perfectly maps on what threatens rela-
tionship in STS does. All other risk-related concepts are missing from STS. This is mainly 
because dominant aim of STS-ml is to capture and represent security requirements ex-
pressed by stakeholders [1]. This scope doesn’t include much from risk related concepts. 
However, we still can model these concepts with some tricks. For example, we can introduce 
additional role of attacker (thus modelling threat agent) and reuse regular goals from STS 
to model vulnerabilities. Nevertheless, STS doesn’t have dedicated elements to map for this 
ISSRM concepts. 
3.3 What is ArchiMate 
ArchiMate is an independent modelling language which provides instruments to analyse, 
describe and visualise relationships between various business domains. It offers one lan-
guage to represent and combine IT systems, organisation structure, business processes, tech-
nical infrastructure and information flows. 
ArchiMate could be used to model enterprise risk management (ERM) along with relation-
ships and concepts of security. This standard is widely accepted and it provides enterprise 
architects with modelling constructs to logically connect business and technical architec-
tures [4].  
Core concepts of ArchiMate define three main types of entities, which represent real world 
entities. These entity types are: 
 Active structure elements (this type of entities has behaviour) 
 Behaviour elements (activities performed by Active structure elements) 
 Passive structure elements (behaviour is performed on them) 
Behaviour elements (services) usually represent functionality which system provide to its 
environment. Active structure elements (interfaces) usually represent endpoints through 
which system services to their environment. ArchiMate core concepts illustrated on figure 
8. On this figure verb applies to closest entity. For example, Interface composes Active 
structure element, and Active structure element composed of Interfaces.  
 
Figure 11. ArchiMate Core concepts [5] 
ArchiMate generalises three core types of relationships between entities in the following 
groups: 
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 Structural relationships (model structural consistency between concepts. This group 
includes association, composition, access, aggregation, used by, assignment and re-
alisation) 
 Dynamic relationships (model dependencies between behaviour entities) 
 Other relationships (neither structural, nor dynamic. Includes grouping, junction, 
specialisation) 
 Based on speciality of each of them, ArchiMate defines three core layers, which are 
listed below:  
 Business Layer (models business processes performed by business actors) 
 Application layer (supports business layer with services realized by software) 
 Technology layer (supports application layer with infrastructure services realised by 
hardware and system software) 
Based on defined layers and concepts ArchiMate results in a nine cell framework illustrated 
on Figure 8 
 
Figure 12. ArchiMate core framework [5] 
In this paper we will not look into full ArchiMate framework, instead we will focus on Risk 
and Security Overlay (RSO) as it fits into scope of this work. 
Risk and Security Overlay (RSO) to ArchiMate presented in [4] extends basic ArchiMate 
to model risk and security concepts with no additional notations [6]. Overall RSO consist of 
eleven new concepts represented by existing notations. ArchiMate Risk and Security Over-
lay general concepts (extracted from [4]) are visualised on figure 9. 
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Figure 13. Risk and Security overlay for ArchiMate [4] 
New concepts presented by RSO are following [6]: 
 Threat agent. Usually modelled by active structure elements such as business actor, 
business role, application component etc. 
 Threat event (event that can influence asset)/Loss event (event that causes damage 
to asset). This one modelled by any business construct.  
 Vulnerability. Modelled as assessment specialisation, because it is result of analys-
ing weaknesses in architecture. 
 Risk. Modelled by assessment construct. 
 Risk/security driver. Modelled by driver construct and represents criteria to analyse 
risk. 
 Risk control objective / Security control objective. Modelled by objective construct. 
Designed from risks and risk/security drivers. 
 Security requirement/control measure. Modelled by requirement construct (control 
measure) 
 Security principle (security policy). Modelled by principle construct.  
3.3.1 Semantics and Concrete Syntax 
Following table presents semantics and concrete syntax for STS. It makes perfect sense to 
combine semantics and concrete syntax in one table because we show how element looks 
like and explains meaning behind it in one place, which makes semantics and concrete syn-
tax easier to remember and understand. 
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Table 3. ArchiMate RSO concepts 
RSO Con-
cept 
Core con-
cept 
Graphical notation Explanation 
Threat agent 
Any active 
structure el-
ement, e.g. 
business ac-
tor 
 
Literally anything that can bypass 
security and cause harm. Can be in-
tentional (attacker) or unintentional 
(executing wrong command). 
Threat event 
Business 
event 
 
Event which can cause some effect 
on asset. Attack - specific type of 
threat events with attacker as threat 
agent. 
Loss event 
Business 
event 
 
Any event that led to asset damage 
or loss. 
Vulnerabil-
ity 
Assessment 
 
Weakness which allows attacker to 
threat asset. Also represents proba-
bility that asset wouldn't be able to 
resist to threat agent’s actions. 
Risk Assessment 
 
Probable frequency and amount of 
future loss which is result of an ac-
tion and/or inaction, foreseen or un-
foreseen [11]. 
Risk/secu-
rity driver 
Driver 
 
Represents criteria by which risks 
are analysed. 
Risk/Secu-
rity control 
objective 
Goal (3.0) 
/Objective 
(2.1) 
 
Control objectives represents a 
high-level statement of intent with 
aim to mitigate risk. They are de-
signed from risk and drivers and re-
designed according to security re-
quirement and principle. 
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Security re-
quirement 
Require-
ment 
 
Abstract security requirement that 
must be met by system [7]. 
Control 
measure 
Require-
ment 
 
Same as security requirement but 
not that abstract, this one is more 
about implementation. 
Security 
principle 
Principle 
 
Security qualitative statement that 
should be met by system. 
Risk/Secu-
rity domain 
Group 
 
Group of entities which share sev-
eral characteristics relevant in risk 
management or security scope [6]. 
For modelling relations between this concepts core ArchiMate relations could be used. Se-
mantic and concrete syntax for them presented in table below, derived from [7]. 
 
Table 4. ArchiMate relationship concepts 
Concept Graphical notation Explanation 
Structural relationships 
Composi-
tion 
 
Represents that element consist of several other con-
cepts. 
Aggrega-
tion 
 
Element groups several other concepts 
Assign-
ment 
 
Allocates responsibility, execution or behaviour. 
Realiza-
tion 
 
Represents that element plays important role in opera-
tion, creation, achievement of other more abstract en-
tity. 
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Dependency relationships 
Serving 
 
Element provide its functionality to other element 
Access 
 
Represents ability of one element to perform actions 
on another passive structure element 
Influence 
 
Represents the fact that element influence achieve-
ment or implementation of some motivational ele-
ment. 
Dynamic relationships 
Triggering 
 
Casual or temporal relationship between elements. 
Flow 
 
Transfer from one element to another. 
Other relationships 
Speciali-
zation 
 
Models that element is exact kind of another element. 
Associa-
tion 
 
For any unspecified relationship. 
Junction 
 
Serves to connect same type relationships. 
3.3.2 Abstract syntax 
In this chapter abstract syntax for specific concepts of ArchiMate Risk and Security Overlay 
and ArchiMate core relationship concepts will be discussed.  
As making UML diagram for relationship concepts doesn't make any sense we will sche-
matically represent them and briefly discuss. 
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Figure 14. ArchiMate relationship concepts overview [7] 
Each relationship should have exactly one “from” and one “to” elements. Following rules 
should apply for all relationships in ArchiMate: 
 Relationship between two relationships are not allowed 
 Relationships connected to relationship connector should be the same type 
 Relationship connecting element with another relationship can be only aggregation, 
composition or association.  
 Chain of relationships connected by relationship connector is valid only if a direct 
relationship between connected elements is valid. 
Following diagrams will illustrate abstract syntax for ArchiMate Risk and Security Overlay. 
We split metamodel into two smaller ones to improve readability. First of them represent 
general concepts, while second illustrate risk related concepts in RSO. In first metamodel 
we introduce two new abstract concepts to catch behaviour - Element, which is abstraction 
over all elements in RSO, and Threat - which consist of Threat agent and Threat event. 
Second metamodel share the same approach with Element abstraction, which is abstraction 
over all other elements. Also, we introduce Requirement, Objective and Driver abstractions 
to sum up their corresponding elements. 
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Figure 15. ArchiMate RSO metamodel 
 
Figure 16. ArchiMate RSO risk related model 
3.3.3 Application guidelines 
This section will explain how to use ArchiMate in terms of ERM and modelling risk and 
security. As risk and security could be modelled with help of ArchiMate Risk and Security 
Overlay this chapter will provide basic example of usage on Healthcare scenario. We will 
not model whole healthcare scenario, but will do the same as we did in application guide-
lines for STS. We will model small part of scenario - Alice's test results in Modern Labs 
possession. Since ArchiMate approach focuses on threats and attacks, instead of information 
representation and possession as it is in STS, we can take models from STS application 
guidelines and think about threats with documents which tangibles Alice's information (Test 
results in our case).  In the following example we will consider SQL injection to Modern 
Labs system as main threat for test results. Keeping this in mind we can easily identify threat 
agent - it will be attacker. With this context we can easily define threat event as attacker 
manages to break into Modern Labs system. We already set our main threat, therefore de-
fining vulnerability is pretty straightforward - SQL injection is possible in Modern Labs 
system. Our asset at risk - test results. Keeping all this in mind we can set up our risk as all 
donor test results leaked. With stated risk we can define risk control objective - prevent 
information leak through SQL injection. Also we can define risk/security driver which will 
be the following: Donor test results should be secure and private. With drivers and risk 
control objective we can proceed to security control objective, which is: Modern Labs want 
to keep test results secure and private. From this point we can define Security principle and 
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Security requirement. Security requirement - Do not allow unauthorized access to data, Se-
curity principle -Test results should be secure and safe. And our last step - define Control 
measure, which should be practical solution to modelled risk. In our case control measure 
will be the following: Validate all inputs to prevent SQL injections. We haven't shown im-
plementation of control measure in this example since this is out of scope of RSO and heav-
ily involves core ArchiMate concepts. 
 
Figure 17. ArchiMate RSO usage example4 
3.3.4 Mapping to ISSRM 
Following chapter will map ArchiMate RSO concepts into ISSRM framework. Mapping is 
done based on explanations provided in [9] for ISSRM side and [6][4] for ArchiMate RSO 
side. Mostly mapping is pretty straightforward since concepts represented in both sides are 
pretty close to each other and sometimes even share a same name. However, this mapping 
could be incomplete and contain mistakes, therefore for double checking it is preferable to 
check information from RSO whitepaper [4]. 
From the table below we can see that mapping is almost full except of Event concept in 
ISSRM. Since ISSRM presents Event as combination of threat and vulnerability we can say 
that modelling threat agent performing a threat event in RSO equivalent to modelling Event 
is RSO. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 This and following RSO models are build in Archi available at: https://www.archimatetool.com/download 
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Table 5. Mapping of ArchiMate RSO into ISSRM [6] 
ISSRM concept RSO concept Construct from ArchiMate 
Asset-related 
concepts 
Asset 
Asset at risk Any core concept Business asset 
IS asset 
Security 
criterion 
Risk/security driver Driver 
Security 
objective 
Security control 
objective 
Goal(3.0)/Objective(2.1) 
Risk-related 
concepts  
Risk Risk Assessment 
Impact Loss Event Business event 
Event - - 
Threat Threat Driver 
Vulnerability Vulnerability Assessment 
Threat agent Threat agent 
Active structure elements 
(business actor) 
Attack method Threat event Business event 
Risk-treatment 
related concepts 
Risk treatment Risk control objective Goal 
Security 
requirements 
Security requirement 
Requirement 
Control measure 
Control 
Implementation of 
control measure 
Any core concept 
Security principle Principle 
3.4 Summary 
This chapter focuses on modelling languages for security and security risk management. 
Initially we briefly described security risk-aware Secure Tropos and Mal-activities for 
UML. We didn’t pay much attention to them as our main focus remain in STS and Archi-
Mate RSO. After that we in details goes through both STS and RSO, covering their seman-
tics, concrete syntaxes and abstract syntaxes. We also present brief application guidelines 
for both STS and RSO, to improve understanding usage of this languages. Application 
guidelines are followed by mappings from STS and RSO to ISSRM. We need these map-
pings for following comparison between them and their integration, as it will be done under 
ISSRM concepts. 
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4 Alignment of ArchiMate RSO and STS 
This section will cover primary contribution of this work – approach merged from both STS 
and ArchiMate RSO along with how this merging was done and comparison of STS and 
ArchiMate RSO. 
4.1 Comparison criteria 
As it was mentioned earlier we will make comparison and integration of STS and ArchiMate 
RSO under ISSRM concepts. We will pay attention to mappings of compared approaches 
into ISSRM, what was done in Chapter 2. Thus, comparison criteria would be following – 
to compare mappings of STS and ArchiMate into ISSRM, taking ISSRM concepts one by 
one and discussing their corresponding elements in STS and RSO. Moreover, we should pay 
attention to possible overlaps between ideas and concepts represented by elements of both 
approaches. In addition, during this process we should think about how concepts from both 
merged approaches can be merged together. 
4.2 Comparison 
This chapter will describe comparison between described in chapter 2 STS and ArchiMate 
approaches. Comparison is done under ISSRM concepts and through comparing STS map-
ping to ISSRM and ArchiMate RSO mapping to ISSRM. 
Through looking into STS mapping into ISSRM (table 2) and ArchiMate RSO mapping into 
ISSRM (table 5) it is clearly seen that STS mapping lacks a lot of things in risk-related and 
risk-treatment related concepts. This fact could be used as a basis for merging this ap-
proaches. Besides that, as it becomes clear after general overview of both approaches, Ar-
chiMate is much more abstract, with a good focus on risk-treatment and risk-related con-
cepts. Whereas STS is more concrete, covering security requirements stated by stakeholders 
and not paying much attention to risks or treatment. In other words, ArchiMate RSO is good 
at covering abstract part and STS is good in covering concrete part of modelling. By this 
statement we can draw a separation line between two approaches. One way to use this is 
following: we can take ArchiMate RSO as basis for newly merged approach and enhance it 
with new concepts from STS, which will cover concrete part of modelling. Obvious down-
side of this approach is that newly introduced STS concepts will overlap over core Archi-
Mate concepts (since ArchiMate RSO is only add-on for core ArchiMate and relies on it to 
model concrete things). Another way is to consider STS as basis for new approach, therefore 
start at concrete level of modelling and enhance it with abstract concepts and risk-related 
ideas from ArchiMate RSO. This way seems more promising as it is not followed by any 
obvious downsides and it is easier to start from lower level of abstraction and move up to a 
higher one. We will follow second way in our merging. 
To make comparison straightforward and clear we will follow divide and conquer principle, 
in other words, we will go one by one for each ISSRM concept and discuss corresponding 
concepts from STS and ArchiMate and how we can use best parts of them in merged ap-
proach. 
4.2.1 Asset-related concepts 
Asset. Asset is anything that is valuable for organization to achieve its goals [9]. ArchiMate 
RSO can represent this concept as any of the core ArchiMate concepts, thus making it a bit 
abstract and general in ArchiMate terms. STS in its turn uses goal, document and infor-
mation to represent assets, which is more detailed. Asset in ISSRM has two sub-types – 
business assets and IS assets. 
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Business asset. In short, business assets are sub-type of assets and usually immaterial [9]. 
ArchiMate RSO doesn’t distinguish assets and their sub-types as they are separated in 
ISSRM. In STS we can “draw” a separation line, and for business assets bucket goes Infor-
mation and Goals (since they are immaterial). Information and goals also called as primary 
assets in STS [1], since they model the most important things for stakeholders. Since we 
decided to use STS as a skeleton for merged approach and ArchiMate RSO doesn’t propose 
specific element for this concept – we can use STS elements in merged approach for busi-
ness asset concept. 
IS asset. Same as business assets, but material (including software). In ArchiMate RSO 
mapping they are the same as business assets and regular assets. In STS mapping documents 
(supporting assets) maps to IS assets. For merging purposes, we will use proposed by STS 
component, because RSO doesn’t propose component for this concept. 
Security criterion. Security criterion is defined in ISSRM as something that characterizes 
a security need [9]. ArchiMate RSO maps this concept for Risk/Security driver, whereas 
STS model this concept as some types of relationships. Since these elements are not over-
lapping and don’t cause any conflicts we can use both of them in merged approach in a way 
that STS element remaining the same and introducing Risk/Security driver as abstract ele-
ment to represent criteria by which we can analyze risk. 
Security objective. Typically, security objectives describe security goal to be achieved (of-
ten in terms of confidentiality integrity and availability). RSO represent this concept as Se-
curity control objective element, which represents high-level statement of intent to mitigate 
risk, whilst STS model this concept in very explicit way – by setting confidentiality, integ-
rity or availability security restrictions over different relations. 
4.2.2 Risk-related concepts 
Risk. As defined in ISSRM – risk is a combination of threat and vulnerability which cause 
harm to assets [9]. As we can see from STS-ISSRM mapping, STS doesn’t have correspond-
ing concept. ArchiMate RSO in its turn have exactly same concept which is also called risk. 
RSO definition for this concept is following - probable frequency and amount of future loss 
which is result of an action and/or inaction, foreseen or unforeseen [11]. Since this ISSRM 
concept is represented only in ArchiMate RSO we will use it in merged approach. 
Impact. ISSRM definition for this concept is following – potential negative consequence of 
a risk that negates security criterion and harms assets when threat is accomplished [9]. As 
we can see in STS to ISSRM mapping – STS doesn’t have representation of this concept. 
RSO represents this concept as loss event element, which is the same as impact in ISSRM. 
As we don’t have any way to represent impact from STS we will use RSO way in our merged 
approach. 
Event. ISSRM definition – aggregation of threat and one or more vulnerabilities [9]. This 
concept is completely missing from ArchiMate RSO as its whole model is built around one 
risk event (for each risk event separate RSO model), therefore making it irrelevant to repre-
sent on a model. On another hand, threat events are the only way to represent risk-related 
concepts in STS. This principal difference in two approaches could be crucial for our newly 
created merged approach, as it can be main point of touch for both STS and ArchiMate. In 
merged approach we can start by following STS guidelines, but when it will come to events 
and threats we can enhance STS way by hiding behind one STS threat event element huge 
variety of RSO concepts to model and represent this threat much better than it was modelled 
and represented by only one event element in original STS. 
42 
 
Threat. ISSRM defines threat as an incident initiated by threat agent with attack method to 
target assets [9]. STS model this concept as threaten relationship between threat event and 
asset. RSO model this concept as threat element which is the same as ISSRM threat. Hence, 
we can keep both concepts in merged approach as they are not overlapping. Threaten rela-
tionship from STS can connect asset under risk with threat event scope which will be ex-
tended by RSO concepts. 
Vulnerability. From [9] – vulnerability is characteristic of asset that exposes a weakness in 
terms of security. As we can see from STS-ISSRM mapping - vulnerability concept is absent 
from STS. ArchiMate model this concept as Vulnerability element, which is pretty straight-
forward. This means that we will use RSO concept in our merged approach. 
Threat agent. ISSRM definition for threat agent – agent that has intention to harm assets 
[9]. RSO represent this concept in a form of threat agent element, which is completely the 
same. As we can see from STS mapping STS doesn’t have dedicated element for this con-
cept. Of course we can use some tricks and use regular actor and role elements to represent 
actor whose goal is to harm assets, but we will not pay attention to this tricks as STS is not 
designed to do these things. Since only RSO propose corresponding concept for threat agent, 
we will use it. 
Attack method. Attack method definition from ISSRM – it describes a standard means by 
which a threat agent executes threat [9]. This concept is completely missing form STS, as 
we can see from STS mapping to ISSRM. ArchiMate RSO represents this concept as threat 
event, with the same meaning as this concept have in ISSRM. As we don’t have correspond-
ing concept from STS, we will use one proposed by RSO. 
4.2.3 Risk-treatment related concepts 
Risk treatment. Definition for this concept in ISSRM is following – decision to treat iden-
tified risk [9]. As we can see from STS mapping, this concept is absent from STS. In Archi-
Mate this concept represented by Risk control objective. Since ISSRM risk treatment con-
cept is represented only in RSO – our merged approach should use only it. 
Security requirements. This concept is defined in ISSRM as condition on the phenomena 
of the environment that we wish to make true [9]. From STS side we set up this conditions 
by authorization element. STS authorization sets up read modify transmit and update access 
rules for assets in scope. RSO maps this ISSRM concept into two elements – security re-
quirement and control measure. Here security requirement is some abstract requirement to 
security that must be met by system. Control measure is somewhat similar to security re-
quirement, but on lower level of abstraction. In other words, control measure is more about 
implementation, not about abstract requirement. Since use cases of mapped elements are not 
overlapping we can take all of them into merged approach, with RSO concepts covering 
abstract part of security requirements concept and STS authorization element covering read 
create transmit and update rules over asset in defined scope. 
Control. In ISSRM control is design means to improve security by implementing security 
requirements [9]. From ISSRM-STS mapping we can see that this concept is completely 
missing from STS. ArchiMate RSO in its turn have two elements to represent this ISSRM 
concept. One is implementation of control measure (which is low-level representation of 
security requirements implementation). Another one is Security principle. Security principle 
is security qualitative statement that should be met by system. Since STS doesn’t have this 
concept we can easily use corresponding RSO concept in merged approach. 
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4.3 Integration 
This section will cover STS and ArchiMate RSO integration along with semantics, concrete 
and abstract syntax for integrated approach. Also, application guidelines presented here, and 
benefits discussed. 
4.3.1 Discussion 
As it was stated above, we will set up integration process as following: we will take STS as 
basic “skeleton” for integrated approach and enhance it with concepts and elements from 
ArchiMate RSO, following fundamentals of secure system modelling from ISSRM. Main 
reason for taking STS as basis is that STS lacks a lot of ISSRM concepts (especially risk-
related), thus making it easier to fill gaps with concepts from RSO. Also, if we would take 
RSO as basis – we would face some overlaps between core ArchiMate parts (they are used 
by risk and security overlay) and STS parts. Another reason is that STS operates with more 
concrete terms than RSO, and from mine perspective it is easier to start with concrete things 
and advance to abstractions. Moreover, during comparison we noticed that Event concept 
from ISSRM could be used as integration point for STS and RSO. This could be used in the 
following way: we can keep STS flow as it is till it comes to events. Instead of representing 
threat as event (as it was in original STS) we can replace event element with RSO concepts. 
This would make perfect sense since whole RSO model are designed in scope of one threat 
event, and we are replacing threat event with RSO model. By doing this we will keep all the 
benefits of STS way in place, greatly improve threat modelling by RSO concepts (various 
RSO concepts make a huge difference comparing to only one threat event which was in 
original STS) and everything related to one threat event will be covered under separate RSO 
model, hidden behind this event, thus not adding mess to original STS models. Connection 
between event and threat event scope is settled through leads to scope relationship. In orig-
inal STS one can use threat events only on social view (as STS focus is on social threats), 
but in integrated approach we propose to use threat events also in information view. This 
would allow us to model threat on information level, in addition to social level. Moreover, 
we propose to set up a new view level in STS and name it “risk and security view”. This 
view will cover all STS events which become exposed into RSO diagrams. In other words, 
this view will show separated by Threat event scope (new element) RSO models connected 
to their corresponding events (new element). On views with events there will be only events 
connected to their scopes (only scope without any inner elements), whilst on risk and secu-
rity view each scope will be exposed and filled with RSO models. Also, we introduce pro-
vokes relationship from loss event to loss event to make integrated approach corresponding 
to ISSRM concepts. 
4.3.2 Semantics and concrete syntax 
Semantics and concrete syntax remains utterly same as STS and ArchiMate RSO semantics 
and concrete syntaxes. Main difference is that in case of integrated approach table repre-
senting semantics and concrete syntax for integrated approach will be a combination of ta-
bles for each approach. Thus, it is unnecessary to provide full abstract syntax of integrated 
approach. Instead we will provide a table semantics and concrete syntax of new or changed 
elements. 
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Table 6. Integrated approach semantics and concrete syntax (only difference) 
Concept Graphical notation Explanation 
Event (STS) 
=> Event 
(Integrated)  
Events as they were represented in STS is re-
placed by new concept. As STS events now be-
come connection points between STS model and 
RSO model (or between Social/Information 
view and Risk and security view) we need to in-
troduce new relationship between this element 
and threat event scope, to connect them. We will 
name this relationship “leads to”.  
Provokes re-
lationship  
Provokes relationship is introduced to cover 
ISSRM’s provokes relationship in integrated ap-
proach. 
Leads to 
scope rela-
tionship 
 
Leads to scope relationship is introduced to con-
nect events with their corresponding threat event 
scopes. 
Asset at risk 
(RSO) 
- 
Got removed because become irrelevant in scope 
of integrated approach. Whole RSO model will 
be connected with asset at risk by threaten rela-
tionship from STS. 
Risk/Secu-
rity domain 
(RSO) => 
Threat event 
scope  
Risk/Security domain element from RSO is re-
designed and now covers up RSO model for each 
threat event and called threat event scope. Also, 
it gains new relationship “caused by” which is 
opposite of  “leads to”. 
Threat event 
(RSO) => 
Attack 
method (In-
tegrated) 
 
Since we already have Event element it would 
make sense to rename threat event element into 
something else, not to confuse people. For this 
purpose, we will use corresponding concept 
from ISSRM for which this RSO concept is 
mapped – attack method.   
 
4.3.3 Abstract syntax 
Abstract syntax for integrated approach remains almost the same as it was in original STS 
and ArchiMate RSO. All changes to abstract syntax are described in a table with concrete 
syntax and semantics. Connection point between STS and RSO models is settled up in a 
relationship between event and threat event scope. 
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Figure 18. Integrated approach main metamodel 
 
Figure 19. Integrated approach risk related metamodel 
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Figure 20. Integrated approach advanced elements metamodel 
4.3.4 Application guidelines 
This chapter illustrates usage example and gives brief application guidelines for integrated 
approach. Since integrated approach heavily depends on original STS and ArchiMate RSO, 
and reuse their mechanics – we will not duplicate descriptions of how to use STS and Ar-
chiMate RSO approaches. Instead of that, we will show how STS and ArchiMate works 
together in merged approach, combining their benefits to enhance integrated approach. 
For this example, we will take the same case which was used for application guidelines in 
STS application guidelines and ArchiMate application guidelines, and which is described in 
Background chapter. As we are building our integration from STS skeleton, following 
guidelines will be quite similar to those presented in STS application guidelines chapter. 
Main difference – new view, which is called “risk and security view”. This view will as-
semble all identified threat events and presented them in a way of RSO models. 
Information view follows the same guidelines as there are written for STS, but with some 
additions. As we propose to start using events on information view also, we will use one 
here. As we can see from figure below, they are used in exactly same way as they are used 
in classic STS. Here we have event “attacker breaks into system” which threatens document 
“test results”. If there will be more documents in ModernLabs scope, then, obviously, event, 
which means breaking into system, would threaten all documents in one possession scope. 
But since we have only one document, this event threatens only one asset. To connect event 
on information view with corresponding RSO model on risk and security view, event and 
threat event scope should share same name. 
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Figure 21. Integrated approach Information view 
Authorization and social view remain the same as they were in STS, because we did not 
introduce any changes to this views in merged approach. Therefore, to check guidelines on 
how to build this views for our integrated approach we can easily check corresponding ap-
plication guidelines for STS method in chapter 2. 
 
Figure 22. Integrated approach Authorization view 
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Figure 23. Integrated approach Social view 
RSO models, assembled into integrated approach under risk and security view, remains 
quite same as they were in original RSO. They lost asset at risk concept as it becomes un-
necessary, since every RSO model is connected with event on either information or social 
view and this event has a threaten relationship with asset at risk. In addition, we renamed 
original RSO threat event concept into attack method (to prevent misunderstanding between 
event and threat event concepts), keeping meaning behind this concept the same. Moreover, 
to correspond to ISSRM terms, we added possible provokes relationship from loss event to 
loss event (as some loss events could cause other loss events by itself). Other than that, 
building RSO model in integrated approach remains utterly same as it is in original RSO 
modelling. Guidelines for building original RSO models are described in application guide-
lines section for ArchiMate. 
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Figure 24. Integrated approach risk and security view 
4.3.5 Benefits 
This section briefly describes benefits of integrated approach. As our integrated approach 
doesn’t change or modify crucial points in STS or ArchiMate RSO and combine them both 
in a way that RSO abstractly models risk and security part and STS models social interac-
tions and system overall on a more concrete level compared to RSO– we can say that inte-
grated approach gains and combines all the benefits and advantages which STS and Archi-
Mate RSO had separately. Since our integration is, in fact, a combination of STS and RSO, 
it would make sense to highlight what exactly gains STS and RSO separately from this 
combination. From STS side: it is easy noticeable from STS description provided in chapter 
3.2, that STS lacks a lot of concepts in risk-related field. STS operates only with threat 
events pointing onto assets at risk. Surely, this is not enough tools to build a good risk and 
security model which will capture various concepts from this field. This is weak point is 
STS and we help it by including ArchiMate RSO models to capture and represent risk and 
security concepts in our integrated approach. With including RSO models into STS we cre-
ate a problem that including so many new concepts into STS could make models messy and 
way too crowded with new elements. We solve this problem by introducing new STS view 
level which we called “risk and security view”. This view will completely consist from RSO 
models, separated one from another by threat event scope, and this models could be mapped 
backwards to events on information or social view by threat event scope name, which must 
be identical to event name. From RSO side: risk and security overlay depends on core Ar-
chiMate to model everything out from scope of risk and security management. In our inte-
gration we replace this core ArchiMate parts with STS and applied risk and security overlay 
to STS. Based on this we can say that from this integration RSO gains all the benefits which 
STS can provide. Most significant among them is that RSO gains socio-technical perspec-
tive on modelling, which is completely missing from original ArchiMate RSO. Moreover, 
as we are taking into consideration only risk and security overlay for ArchiMate and not 
whole core ArchiMate – RSO doesn’t have any tools or concepts to model anything out of 
risk and security field, it relies on core ArchiMate to do this. As we are integrating STS and 
RSO strictly (without core ArchiMate) – STS concepts replace core ArchiMate concepts to 
model systems which can have risks, which are modelled by RSO. 
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4.4 Summary 
In this chapter we set up comparison criteria for STS and RSO. Comparison criteria is 
strongly bounded to ISSRM, as we are comparing and integrating this approaches under 
ISSRM and is following: to compare mappings of STS and ArchiMate into ISSRM, taking 
ISSRM concepts one by one and discussing their corresponding elements in STS and RSO.  
Moreover, this chapter presents actual comparison following defined comparison criteria. 
Based on this comparison we produce actual integration of STS and ArchiMate RSO into 
new integrated approach. This integrated approach turned out to be combination of both 
STS and ArchiMate RSO, keeping original flows of modelling and separating concerns of 
this two approaches on different view levels. Connection point is settled up in event concept 
from original STS, as it now leads us to whole RSO model, instead of one event concept, as 
it was in original STS. 
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5 Comparison of security risk management approaches 
Following chapter will show usage of different security risk management approaches and 
compare them in terms of completeness in ISSRM scope. This comparison would evaluate 
that our integrated approach could be handy and useful and deserves to live. 
5.1 Case description 
As ongoing case for this chapter we picked up example from BPMN course in Tartu Uni-
versity, as it was already well investigated by me during this course and it is pretty complex. 
Detailed textual case description could be found on university website5. For better 
understanding of Prescription fulfillment process we provided BPMs, which were created 
during that course. They are provided in appendixes I and II. 
Through reading case description and examining BPMs we found out that main risks could 
be the following: Violator could steal/modify private data from pharmacy system by 
exploiting intercept transmit channel, Violator could hack drug untilization review (DUR) 
check for his own needs and violator could hack insurance check for his own needs. 
5.2 ArchiMate RSO 
As we are not taking into consideration full ArchiMate, but only risk and security overlay 
for ArchiMate, following case will show models relevant only to overlay, without using 
core ArchiMate concepts. As our identified risks are stated in the case description we will 
consider them as our main threats for this case, as for all other also. Usual flow for building 
RSO model is following: we identify our most important assets and find vulnerabilities 
which can cause harm to these assets. By this we found our risks. From this we can define 
risk/security driver. At this point we can identify control objectives, and through them we 
can state security requirement for system. Out of security requirement and security principle 
we set up control measures to mitigate identified risk and close identified vulnerability. Each 
risk has separate RSO model to describe it. For SQL injection we come up with validating 
inputs. For intercept transmit channel we set up control measures as usage of secure con-
nection and data encryption. Control measure for bruteforce attack – implementation of two 
factor authentication.  
 
Figure 25. RSO Violator modifies insurance check results 
                                                 
5 https://courses.cs.ut.ee/MTAT.03.231/2017_spring/uploads/Main/PrescriptionFulfillment.pdf 
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Figure 26. RSO. Violator steals customer data 
 
Figure 27. RSO. Violator modifies DUR check 
5.3 STS 
As we know from previous chapters STS have three different views to represent system. 
From information view we can see who owns what information and in which documents 
does this information become tangible. Through authorization view we can see which infor-
mation is authorized to another role/agent along with rules settled over this authorization 
and in scope of which goal this is done. Most interesting view for us is social view, as only 
it can contain threat events. As we can see from it, Customer data in a form of prescription 
gets transmitted 4 times, where each transmission is threatened (intercept transmit channel). 
Also, we can clearly see where in the system DUR and insurance checks results are threat-
ened, as well as information flows and security requirements settled over them. 
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Figure 28. STS social view 
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Figure 29. STS information view 
 
 
 
Figure 30. STS authorization view 
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5.4 Integrated 
Overall, as integrated approach is a combination of STS and ArchiMate RSO, and reuse all 
their mechanics, nothing will change in STS views. Therefore, it is not necessary to dupli-
cate models which are presented in STS subsection. Full model of integrated approach will 
be duplicated STS models plus models presented on figures in this subsection, where models 
presented in this subsection connected to threat events on STS models. Models presented in 
this subsection is our new risk and security view. This view is an expansion for classic STS 
events, which describe risks and vulnerabilities much better then only one event construct 
could. Also, this view introduces concept of risk treatment into STS, which were completely 
missing. However, models which represent new risk and security view doesn’t differ much 
from RSO models. They don’t have asset at risk element, and threat event scope name cor-
responds to threat event name on social/information view. 
 
Figure 31. Integrated risk and security view. Intercept channel 
 
Figure 32. Integrated risk and security view. DUR modified 
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Figure 33. Integrated risk and security view. Insurance check modified 
5.5 Security risk-aware Secure Tropos 
Secure Tropos process consist of the following stages: assets identification, risk analysis, 
definition of security criterias. We will follow same steps to model our case here. Model 
below represents refined assets and security criterion for our case. Most important task on 
the model below is manage pharmacy storage, which is split into three lower level tasks. 
This model also presents security criterions “integrity of prescription” and “integrity of 
checks” settled up over the business assets. In Secure Tropos we can set up security objec-
tives by softgoals and refine them using security constraints. Secure Tropos satisfies security 
constraints through achieving security goals, which are also system assets. In our example 
security constraints are “only if authorized” is satisfied by achieving secure goal “Access 
only for authorized users”. Plan “check login and password” satisfies security goal, therefore 
improving overall security of system. 
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Figure 34. Business assets modelling for Secure Tropos 
 
Figure 35. Assets identification for Secure Tropos 
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On the second step we include risk into our model. On figure below we illustrate security 
event “intercepted channel usage” which impacts “integrity of prescription”, “brute force 
attack” which impacts “integrity of DUR check” and “SQL injection” which impacts “in-
tegrity of insurance check”. Detailed description of this risks is provided on the figure with 
potential attack scenario. Within it violator uses threats (“collect info and steal customer 
data”, “collect info and change DUR result”, “insert SQL that change insurance check”) 
which attacks “pharmacy system storage”, which holds organization’s assets such as “pre-
scription record”, “DUR result”, “Insurance check result”. Also, on this model we can see 
that violator’s attack method “check password repeatedly” exploits vulnerability in “check 
login and password”, attack method “repeatedly input SQL” exploits vulnerability in “store 
insurance check in DB”, attack method “catch prescription thorough intercepts channel” 
exploits vulnerability in “send info through channel”. 
 
Figure 36. Identification of security risk for Secure Tropos 
On this stage we should define security criterias. So, to mitigate identified risks we made 
risk reduction decisions. For example, to mitigate brute force attack we implement two fac-
tor authentication, to protect ourselves from SQL injections we will validate all inputs, to 
mitigate interception of channel, we will use secure connection.  
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Figure 37. Potential attack scenario for Secure Tropos 
 
Figure 38. Security requirements definition for Secure Tropos 
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5.6 Design and Engineering methodology for Organizations (DEMO) 
We have on it three composite actor roles which forms our environment and three elemen-
tary actor roles which forms our composition. As we can see from model, technician and 
pharmacist interact with pharmacy system and DUR and Insurance checkers in a form of 
transactions. These transactions usually transmit information through them. It is important 
to keep in mind that transaction should be connected by initiator link with actor role which 
initiates this transaction and by executor link with actor role that should perform this trans-
action. To define what information is transmitted we connect elementary role actors with 
production banks (they represent information). Through this connection it is possible to 
found out what information is transmitted. Also, if elementary or composite actor role relies 
on some information or produce it – we shout connect this role with production bank by 
access link. To model violator, we define brand new composite actor role named violator. 
This role is indicated to abuse system vulnerabilities and harm assets in various ways. We 
model violators attacks by defining transaction kinds with indicating in their names used 
vulnerability and harmed asset. These transactions are initiated by violator and executed by 
corresponding actor role from organization boundary (composition role). In addition, as vi-
olator gaining access to corresponding information, we should connect him with appropriate 
production bank. Unfortunately, DEMO does not provide any tools to highlight risk mitiga-
tion, therefore they are missing from this model. 
 
Figure 39. DEMO construction model6 
                                                 
6 This model is built in online tool available at: http://www.modelworld.nl/ 
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5.7 Comparison 
Comparison criteria. To validate our integrated approach, we will compare all described 
in this chapter approaches to modelling in terms of completeness with respect to ISSRM. 
This means that we will go through ISSRM domain model and all possible relationships 
presented in this model and explain how are they presented in current approach. This would 
give us results of how complete described approach is in terms of ISSRM, and this results 
could be compared with each other. Through this comparison we will validate how complete 
our integrated approach is in terms of ISSRM. 
We will distinguish ISSRM concepts by risk treatment related, risk related and asset related 
concepts. Asset related concepts include following elements: Asset, Business Asset, IS As-
set, Security criterion and Security objective, along with following relationships: constraint 
of and supports. Overall 5 elements and 2 relationships. Risk related concepts include fol-
lowing elements: Attack method, Threat agent, Threat, Risk, Impact, Event, Vulnerability, 
and along with following relationships: uses, exploits, leads to, targets, characteristic of, 
provokes, harms, negates and significance assessed by. Overall 7 elements and 9 relation-
ships. Risk treatment related concepts include following elements: Risk treatment, Secu-
rity requirements and Control along with following relationships: Refines, implements, de-
cision to treat and mitigates. Overall 3 elements and 4 relationships. 
Note that in sections 5.7.1 – 5.7.5 we will highlight concepts from discussed approach with 
italic and ISSRM concepts will remain as plain text.  
5.7.1 ArchiMate RSO 
As for elements completeness we can check RSO mapping presented in section 3.3.4 to 
check what ISSRM elements are presented in RSO. 
Asset related concepts.  According to table 5 RSO contains 5 out of 5 ISSRM asset related 
elements. ISSRM supports relationship presented as composition/aggregation relationships 
between assets elements. Constraint of relationship is presented in a form of connected 
risk/security driver to asset. Thus, RSO fully represents ISSRM asset related concepts, 5 
pout of 5 elements and 2 out of 2 relationships. 
Risk related concepts. According to table 5 RSO contains 6 out of 7 ISSRM risk related 
elements. Because RSO doesn’t have event element (threat event relates to attack method, 
not to event), it is obvious that RSO will not have leads to relationship presented. Uses 
relationships is modelled by connecting threat agent with threat event. Threat exploiting 
vulnerability relationship is visualised by connection between threat event and vulnerability. 
Characteristic of relationship is modelled by association relationship between vulnerability 
and asset. As threat is modelled as a combination threat agent and threat event, we can say 
that ISSRM targets relationship is represented by association between this combination and 
asset (through vulnerability). Harms relationship is represented by loss event connected with 
asset through vulnerability by association relationship. Negates relationship becomes tan-
gible by connection between loss event and risk/security driver. Provokes relationship is 
missing from RSO as it is not intended to model impacts (loss event) to cause (provokes) 
other impacts. Significance assessed by relationship is captured in a form of connection 
between risk (RSO risk) and security criterion (risk/security driver). To summarise, RSO in 
scope of SSRM risk related concepts represents 6 out of 7 elements and 7 out of 9 relation-
ships. 
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Risk treatment related concepts. According to table 5 RSO contains 3out of 3 ISSRM risk 
treatment related concepts. ISSRM implements relationship is captured by realization rela-
tionship between control measure and security principle. Mitigates relationship from 
ISSRM is represented in a form of a sequence of connections from security requirement to 
risk (goes through security control objective and risk control objective to reach risk). Refines 
relationship is captured by relationships from control measure and security requirement to 
risk control objective through security control objective. Moreover, risk/security control 
objectives are refined by security requirement and principle after they are initially designed, 
according to [6]. Decision to treat relationship is modelled by association relationship be-
tween risk and risk control objective. To sum up, RSO in scope of risk treatment related 
concepts represents 3 out of 3 elements and 4 out of 4 relationships. 
Total. Overall, RSO covers 14 out of 15 elements and 13 out of 15 relationships. 
5.7.2 STS 
As for elements completeness we can check STS to ISSRM mapping in section 3.2.4 to see 
what elements from ISSRM are presented in STS. 
Asset related concepts. Based on table 2 we have 5 out of 5 elements present. ISSRM 
support relationship presented in form of tangible by relationship. ISSRM constraint of re-
lationship is missing from STS. To sum up, in scope of asset related concepts STS covers 5 
out of 5 elements and 1 out of 2 relationships. 
Risk related concepts. Based on table 2 we have 2 out of 7 elements presented. Because of 
such a poor presence of risk related concepts there couldn’t be too much relationships pre-
sent. Because of absence of threat agent and attack method there couldn’t be any uses rela-
tionship. Vulnerability is also not present is STS, thus making impossible to model charac-
teristic of and exploits relationships. There is no impact concept, which means that leads to, 
negates and provokes relationships can’t be modelled. Risk concept is also absent, making 
significance assessed by relationship absent from STS. However, harms relationship is pre-
sent in a form of threat event combined with threaten relationship. Also direction of threaten 
relationship points to asset in danger, thus modelling ISSRM targets relationship. To sum 
up, in scope of risk related concepts STS covers 2out of 7 elements and 2out of 9 relation-
ships. 
Risk treatment related concepts. Based on table 2 we have 1 out of 3 elements presented. 
Because of having only one element presented in STS we can’t really build any relation-
ships. Therefore, we have 1 out of 3 elements and 0out of 4 relationships covered in scope 
of risk treatment related concepts by STS. 
Total. Overall, STS covers 8 out of 15 elements and 3 out of 15 relationships. 
5.7.3 Integrated 
Because integrated approach is a combination of STS and RSO, and they do not overlap 
each other (because RSO models presented on a separate view) we can say that integrated 
approach gains all ISSRM related elements and relationships from both STS and RSO. As 
for elements, RSO lacked only event concept from ISSRM, which is presented is STS in a 
form of threat event. Thus, we can say that integrated approach covers all elements from 
ISSRM. As for ISSRM relationships, side by side comparison of what is covered in STS 
and what is covered is RSO (as all these relationships are migrated into integrated approach) 
showed that provokes and leads to relationships remain uncovered. But, leads to relation-
ship, which shows how event leads to impact is present in integrated approach. It is viable 
by connection between STS threat event and risk and security view model in a form of 
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shared name. By this connection we can follow which event leads to which impact. Also, 
during integration we added provokes relationship from loss event to loss event (can be seen 
on integrated domain model), to capture ISSRM’s provokes relationship. With this in mind 
we can say that integrated approach entirely covers ISSRM, thus making it fully complete 
in terms of ISSRM (15 out of 15 elements and 15 out of 15 relationships). 
5.7.4 Secure Tropos 
Asset related concepts. Assets are presented in a form of resource, hardgoal, softgoal, plan 
and actor. ISSRM support concept is presented in a form of dependency, means-ends, con-
tribution and decomposition relationships. Security criterion is assembled by softgoal and 
security constraint, where softgoal – high security criteria and constraint – refinements it. 
Implicit constraint is placed by dependency relationship. Explicit constraint is modelled by 
restricts relationship. ISSRM Security objective is missing from Secure Tropos. Therefore, 
based on asset related concepts, Secure Tropos covers 4 out of 5 elements and 2 out of 2 
relationships.  
Risk related concepts. For this concepts we use darker backgrounds to capture malicious 
intentions, as it could be seen on figure 37. Therefore, when corresponding Secure Tropos 
constructs is mentioned in this paragraph it is meant to be with darker background. ISSRM 
threat agent concept is captured by agent concept. Attack method is modelled by plan. 
Threat is represented by hardgoal or plan. Black dot represents vulnerability. Actor, goal, 
plan, targets, exploits and vulnerability dot in combination represents event concept from 
ISSRM. ISSRM Event could also be presented as threat construct. ISSRM Risk is visualised 
by threat with impacts relationship. Impact is modelled as impacts relationship. As for re-
lationships: attack relationship represents targets relationship. Exploits relationship, which 
links threat and asset with vulnerability represents ISSRM exploits relationship. Uses rela-
tionship is presented in form of agent scope (e.g. when agent executes plan which is inside 
his scope). Characteristic of construct is presented in a form of adding vulnerability point to 
asset as an attribute. Leads to, harms and negates relationships are presented by impacts 
relationship. However, Secure Tropos missing provokes and significance assessed by rela-
tionships from ISSRM. To sum up, based on risk related concepts Secure Tropos represents 
7 out of 7 elements and 7 out of 9 relationships.  
Risk treatment related concepts. To differentiate between constructs from this scope and 
other scopes we use dotted background as it could be seen on figure 38. Therefore, when 
corresponding Secure Tropos constructs is mentioned in this paragraph it is meant to be with 
dotted background. Security requirement ISSRM construct is modelled by combination of 
actor, goal, plan, resource, softgoal and security constraint and is visualised on security 
requirements definition model. Control ISSRM construct is presented in a form of combin-
ing security requirement components by dependency, means-ends, contribution and decom-
position relationships. Regarding relationships, Secure Tropos models only ISSRM miti-
gates relationship by its mitigates relationship. Other ISSRM relationships (refines, imple-
ments, decision to treat) are not presented in Secure Tropos. To sum up, Secure Tropos 
covers 2 out of 3 elements and 1 out of 4 relationships presented in ISSRM risk treatment 
related concepts. 
Total. Overall, Secure Tropos covers 13 out of 15 ISSRM elements and 10 out of 15 rela-
tionships. 
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5.7.5 DEMO 
Asset related concepts. ISSRM assets, business assets and IS assets are presented as ele-
mentary and aggregate production banks. Security criterion and security objective elements 
are missing from DEMO. Supports relationships presented in a way of merged access rela-
tionships from different production banks. As we don’t have security criterion presented in 
DEMO there couldn’t be constraint of relationship. To sum up, DEMO covers 3 out of 5 
elements and 1 out of 2 relationships in ISSRM asset related concepts. 
Risk related concepts. Risk, event and threat concepts are missing from DEMO. Threat 
agent is modelled by composite actor role outside of organizational boundary. Attack 
method is described by malicious transaction kind connected to threat agent. Vulnerability 
is partially presented in textual description to transaction kind. Impact is partially repre-
sented by access links to malicious composite actor role, as they show what assets are im-
pacted. Uses and exploits relationships are presented by initiator link from malicious actor 
role to transaction kind. Because of absence of event concept, it is impossible to model 
leads to relationship. There is no threat to target asset, thus targets relationship is absent 
from DEMO. Characteristic of and harms relationship is present in a form of executor link 
from malicious transaction kind to elementary actor role which connects to targeted asset 
by access link. Provokes relationship is impossible to model in DEMO, because impact 
concept is only partially represented. Negates relationship can’t be modelled because there 
is no concept of security criterion in DEMO. Significance assessed by relationship can’t be 
modelled because neither risk nor security concepts are present in DEMO. To sum up, 
DEMO covers 4 out of 7 elements and 4 out of 9 relationships in ISSRM risk related con-
cepts. 
Risk treatment related concepts. Risk treatment elements are completely missing from 
DEMO, because this language is not intended to treat risks in first place. Without any ele-
ments presented in DEMO it can’t model any corresponding relationships. Therefore, we 
have 0 out of 3 elements and 0 out of 4 relationships coverage of ISSRM risk treatment 
related concepts by DEMO. 
Total. Overall, DEMO covers 7 out of 15 elements and 5 out of 15 relationships from 
ISSRM. 
5.8 Discussion 
Tables below (table 7 – table 9) summarises in a more understandable manner what have 
been discussed in this chapter. By green colour (and ✔️ symbol) we highlight that this ISSRM 
concept is supported in corresponding approach, by red colour (and X symbol) – that this 
concept is not supported. As it was already mentioned (and highlighted in tables) our inte-
grated approach fully covers ISSRM concepts, whereas all other approaches miss some of 
the concepts. Based on this we can say that integrated approach fulfils completeness with 
ISSRM scope on 100%. Moreover, integrated approach was able to identify that threat of 
violator intercepts transfer of game report could happen in three different places, on three 
different transfers. Secure Tropos and DEMO wasn’t able to point out this fact. Also, from 
this comparison it is obvious that RSO is the strongest approach (among initial ones) in risk 
and risk treatment related fields. This is a good sign, because we are heavily using RSO in 
our integrated approach. It is worth saying that Secure Tropos sometimes could give some 
suggestions on how attack could be done (find login to pharmacy system on technician 
screen, figure 37), which is missing from other approaches. In addition, it is worth mention-
ing that I spend more time on building integrated model than on any other model (unfortu-
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nately I haven’t measured time for building models, so I can’t give exact numbers). How-
ever, building integrated model should take at least equivalent time as building STS and 
RSO models, because integrated is combination of this two models. Despite the fact that 
integrated approach is the most time consuming, it is still worth to build it, as it gives the 
broadest view and the only one which fully complete in ISSRM terms. 
As for huge benefit of this kind of comparison and argumentation I see lack of subjectivity. 
It simply couldn’t be subjective as whole comparison is based on ISSRM and we have nu-
merical output from this comparison, which can easily point to the best solution. Regarding 
minuses and threats to validity of this results I would highlight possibility of mistakes in 
understanding some points of described approaches, which could influence results. This 
could cause wrong interpretation of approach concepts and as a result – change numbers of 
how much and what concepts from approach correlates with concepts from ISSRM. How-
ever, this possibility shouldn’t affect results for integrated approach, since it was created in 
this paper and is fully understandable by author. As main outcome of this comparison is fact 
that integrated approach fully complete in terms of ISSRM, validity threat to results of other 
approaches could be neglected. 
 
Table 7. Asset related concepts comaprison 
Asset related concepts 
 Tropos STS RSO Integrated DEMO 
E
le
m
en
ts
 
Asset ✔️ ✔️ ✔️ ✔️ ✔️ 
Business 
Asset 
✔️ ✔️ ✔️ ✔️ ✔️ 
IS Asset ✔️ ✔️ ✔️ ✔️ ✔️ 
Security 
criterion 
✔️ ✔️ ✔️ ✔️ X 
Security 
objective 
X ✔️ ✔️ ✔️ X 
R
el
at
io
n
-
sh
ip
s 
Constraint 
of 
✔️ X ✔️ ✔️ X 
Supports ✔️ ✔️ ✔️ ✔️ ✔️ 
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Table 8. Risk related concepts comparison 
Risk related concepts 
 Tropos STS RSO Integrated DEMO 
E
le
m
en
ts
 
Risk ✔️ X ✔️ ✔️ X 
Impact ✔️ X ✔️ ✔️ ✔️ 
Event ✔️ ✔️ X ✔️ X 
Threat ✔️ ✔️ ✔️ ✔️ X 
Vulnerability ✔️ X ✔️ ✔️ ✔️ 
Threat agent ✔️ X ✔️ ✔️ ✔️ 
Attack 
method 
✔️ X ✔️ ✔️ ✔️ 
R
el
at
io
n
sh
ip
s 
Uses ✔️ X ✔️ ✔️ ✔️ 
Exploits ✔️ X ✔️ ✔️ ✔️ 
Leads to ✔️ X X ✔️ X 
Targets ✔️ ✔️ ✔️ ✔️ X 
Characteristic 
of 
✔️ X ✔️ ✔️ ✔️ 
Provokes X X X ✔️ X 
Harms ✔️ ✔️ ✔️ ✔️ ✔️ 
Negates ✔️ X ✔️ ✔️ X 
Significance 
assessed by 
X X ✔️ ✔️ X 
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Table 9. Risk treatment related concepts comparison 
Risk treatment related concepts 
 Tropos STS RSO Integrated DEMO 
E
le
m
en
ts
 
Risk treat-
ment 
X X ✔️ ✔️ X 
Security 
require-
ments 
✔️ ✔️ ✔️ ✔️ X 
Control ✔️ X ✔️ ✔️ X 
R
el
at
io
n
sh
ip
s 
Refines X X ✔️ ✔️ X 
Imple-
ments 
X X ✔️ ✔️ X 
Decision 
to treat 
X X ✔️ ✔️ X 
Mitigates ✔️ X ✔️ ✔️ X 
 
5.9 Summary 
Firstly, this chapter models the same case from perspective of five different modelling ap-
proaches. After that this chapter presents comparison criteria to compare described ap-
proaches in terms of completeness in ISSRM terms, and performs this comparison. Com-
parison results are summarised in tables, which highlights what ISSRM concepts are sup-
ported in each modelling approach. Taking into consideration comparison in terms of com-
pleteness from ISSRM point of view and modelled cases this chapter discusses about why 
our integrated approach is good providing argumentation for it, thus validating our inte-
grated approach. 
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6 Conclusion 
In this work we presented a brief overview of ISSRM and in details we walked through both 
ArchiMate RSO and STS approaches for risk management modelling. For both Risk and 
security overlay and STS we presented semantics, concrete and abstract syntaxes along with 
application guidelines and mapping to ISSRM. Based on these mappings we compared STS 
with RSO and identified how we can integrate them into one approach. Integration was done 
through combination of STS and RSO into one approach. STS approach and RSO approach 
remained mostly unchanged as they are not really overlapping. We combined them together 
as they are handling different aspects of security risk modelling. Their connection point is 
event concept from STS. In integrated approach event points out to threat event scope (RSO 
model) on newly introduced risk and security view (contains all RSO models), as RSO mod-
els extends and enhances events ability to model risks. As threat event scope and event 
shares the same name, we can backtrack from one to another and connect them. Integration 
was followed by evaluation of our new integrated approach. Evaluation is done in terms of 
completeness in ISSRM concepts and visual comparison of models from different ap-
proaches (STS, RSO, Integrated, Secure Tropos, DEMO). Evaluation highlighted positive 
sides of new approach (full completeness in ISSRM terms, pointed out on various places 
where considered attack is possible, heavy loaded with information risk and security view) 
and negative ones (the most time-consuming model building among all compared ap-
proaches). 
To sum up, in this work we propose new integrated approach for security risk modelling, 
which is built from combination of STS and ArchiMate RSO. Integrated approach can be 
considered as a good one because it is fully complete in ISSRM terms, could point on spe-
cific places where attack could be done and gather risk and risk treatment related concepts 
on risk and security view. As a downside of integrated approach we can highlight the fact 
that it is more time consuming then other approaches (takes more time then STS and RSO 
combined).  
6.1 Limitations 
One of the main limitations of this work is subjectivity. Mapping of STS to ISSRM was 
done fairly subjectively, as it was based on our overall understanding of ISSRM and STS 
concepts. Also, choice of the way how STS and RSO are integrated is subjective too. This 
subjectivism could cause some disagreement and discussions over various points in this 
work, despite the fact that we tried to argument each and every decision made. Second huge 
limitation of this work is that example, based on which we created all our models, is not a 
real world example. Of course, it is based on the real world Hong Kong Blood Transfusion 
Centre system, but it is more like adapted for studies example. Moreover, we haven’t mod-
elled full BTC process, only a tiny part of it. That means that current integrated approach 
hasn’t been applied to extensive real world example, and during this application there could 
be identified additional weak points of approach or possible improvements. Moreover, dur-
ing modelling we used obvious attack methods, like SQL injection. Usage of more advanced 
attack method could possibly highlight some weak points in integrated approach. 
6.2 Answers to Research Questions 
What is ArchiMate risk and security overlay and how it maps into ISSRM? 
RSO is extension to ArchiMate language, which focuses on modelling risks and security 
and fully relies on ArchiMate constructs with altered meaning to do this. ArchiMate in its 
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turn is an enterprise architecture modelling language, developed by The Open Group. De-
tailed description of ArchiMate risk and security overlay and its mapping into ISSRM is 
provided in section 3.3. 
What is STS and how it maps into ISSRM? 
STS is a method for designing secure software systems. It builds models using its own STS 
modelling language. Main idea is that system design should take into consideration social 
interactions between actors. Detailed description for STS and its mapping into ISSRM is 
provided in section 3.2. 
What is comparison criteria for ArchiMate RSO and STS? 
As we are comparing STS and ArchiMate under ISSRM – comparison criteria will be fol-
lowing: to compare mappings of STS and ArchiMate into ISSRM, taking ISSRM concepts 
one by one and discussing their corresponding elements in STS and RSO. Moreover, we 
should pay attention to possible overlaps between ideas and concepts represented by ele-
ments of both approaches. In addition, during this process we should think about how con-
cepts from both merged approaches can be merged together. 
What is the optimal way to integrate ArchiMate RSO and STS? 
As it was mentioned in the work, the most optimal identified way of integration STS and 
ArchiMate is to combine them in one approach with STS and RSO playing their correspond-
ing separate roles. Idea was to keep original functionality of STS and RSO the same, putting 
RSO models into new risk and security view. This separating RSO models into new view 
created a question of how can we connect this view with models on other views. Solution 
was pretty obvious, we connected RSO models with event concept from original STS. With 
this connection we use RSO models as extensions and enhancements for event concept, 
because with a whole separate modelling approach we can model risks and security much 
better then with one event and threaten relationship. More details for this question is pro-
vided in chapter 4. 
How can integrated approach benefit from ArchiMate RSO and STS? 
From STS side – advanced threat modelling way with separate view dedicated for risk and 
security. From RSO side – socio-technical perspective on the system. Also, by additional 
adjustments (e.g. introducing provokes relationship for loss event) we achieved full cover-
age of ISSRM concepts in integrated approach. In details this question is answered in section 
4.3.5. 
How can integrated approach be evaluated? 
We evaluate integrated approach in terms of completeness from ISSRM point of view. We 
calculate how much of ISSRM concepts is present in integrated approach. By doing this we 
achieve numerical result which can be easily compared with other approaches. As for other 
approaches (except STS, RSO and integrated) we decided to choose Secure Tropos (because 
it shares social perspective on modelling with STS) and DEMO (it is designed for enterprise 
architecture, same as ArchiMate). In addition to this we provide models for not a trivial case 
for all five approaches, to be able to visually compare models. All this is covered in details 
in chapter 5. 
What is completeness of integrated approach regarding ISSRM? 
Comparison provided in section 5.7 shows that integrated approach is fully complete re-
garding ISSRM concepts by showing how each ISSRM element and relationship is repre-
sented in integrated approach. For more details, check section 5.7. 
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What are the directions of future work to improve integrated approach? 
Try out integrated approach on real world example, prototype implementation, revising con-
nection between threat events and threat event scope. This question is answered in more 
details in section 6.3. 
6.3 Future work 
For future work, first of all, it is necessary to negate all identified limitations.  Main work, 
that should be done, is to try out our integrated approach on real world enterprise example. 
This would prove that our subjective decisions were right or at least have a right to exist. In 
any case, there is nothing better for new modelling approach then feedback from real world 
users. Moreover, it would be good to implement prototype through which users could try 
out our integrated approach. Also, connection between threat events and risk and security 
view can possibly be improved.  
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Appendix 
I. Prescription fulfillment process 
 
 
II. Serve customer from prescription fulfillment process 
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